本篇文章由我翻译，全文共26页，本篇为节选的第三部分约6页内容，原文为英文并附于末尾，红色标注为原文附带的注释，蓝色标注为我添加的补充和注释。文章中引用部分若已有汉译本，则一概使用汉译本的翻译，并补充标注汉译本的引用文献。由于专栏编辑器中不能设置斜体，我用加粗来代替斜体。 为了方便，我会在正文中加入页码，表示方法如【288】。
四、马克思所受到的黑格尔主义吸引
既然在黑格尔身上也找不到“黑格尔的辩证法”，那么认为它在马克思身上扮演了更重要的角色的观点又是否合理呢？当然，众所周知，马克思在晚年就经常提及黑格尔对他的所谓影响(his alleged debt to Hegel)，甚至在《资本论》德文第二版(1873)跋里那句由阿尔都塞所命名的“名言”中，马克思也认为他自己的“方法”确实在某种程度上是一种源于黑格尔（尽管相当曲折）的“辩证”方法。但这样的信仰表态并不能证明什么。正如我在上文所述，马克思所接受的黑格尔主义哲学教育确实对他对经济学理论的发展做出了实在又矛盾的贡献。它为马克思提供了一套非常适合于理解货币作为价值的“一般等价形式”的语言公式。但却没有为他提供任何分析方法或论证方式。马克思他自己并没有准确地理解黑格尔主义哲学对他的贡献，但这在科学史上十分平常。
(资料图)
然而，我并不想仅仅指出这一事实，即在他成熟的经济分析中——尤其是在《资本论》中，“特别是在它的第一章”(18)——马克思并没有运用任何特别的“辩证”论证方式。我想指出的是，为了实现这些分析，为了做出他最重要的经济学发现，马克思的确必须拒绝这种论证方式：也就是那种【295】黑格尔主义下经济范畴的“推导”，就像最近某些人试图以他的名义或代表他做的那样。实际上，鉴于他的分析对象的本体论特征，马克思确实也曾很想这样做，甚至他有时候也会屈服于黑格尔主义的吸引力。黑格尔主义论证方式对马克思的吸引力在《政治经济学批判大纲》中表现得尤为明显，但与罗曼·罗斯多尔斯基在他那本意义深远的著作《马克思〈资本论〉的形成》中所提出的解读传统相反，我认为应该用马克思以圣安东尼的姿态击退黑格尔恶魔(19)的方式来解读这些文本。
马克思在写作《政治经济学批判大纲》期间的1858年1月14日曾给恩格斯写了一封经常被人引用的信，在其中，马克思提到他最近在经济学研究中“取得了很好的进展”，并说“完全由于偶然的机会……我又把黑格尔的《逻辑学》浏览了一遍，这在材料加工的方法上帮了我很大的忙。”[10]现在，值得注意的是，马克思为这一“很好的进展”列举的具体例子并不是有关价值本身的理论，而是对利润的分析。既然我们已经了解了这一点，而且无论如何（正如Arthur, 1991在一篇关于“马克思与黑格尔关系”的文献综述中就这封信所指出的那样），《政治经济学批判大纲》由一系列带有日期的笔记本所组成，对相关文本进行研究以分析马克思对黑格尔著作的再次阅读是否真的像他当时自己所认为的那样对他有很大帮助是一件非常简单的事。对黑格尔著作的再次阅读确实表明了马克思十分努力地运用黑格尔主义图式和论证方法，但这一行为只会使他不断地陷入理论的死胡同中。
【296】在所谓《资本章》的前半部分，就有两个相当明显的例子，表明马克思尝试依照黑格尔主义“三段论”的“环节”来组织他的研究内容。(Marx, 1973, 264, 275-6/MEW, Vol. 42, 188, 201)(20)然而，对我们的目的来说，更重要的是出现在这两段分类试验之间的一段话，我认为这段话标志着了马克思就为货币转化为资本的黑格尔主义“过渡”所做出的唯一值得注意的尝试。这段话尤为重要，因为“新”黑格尔马克思主义者几乎无一例外地坚持着这样一个“过渡”的存在或至少是可行性，以证明他们所捍卫的“方法”的正确性。马克思在这里写的是：
“我们在货币上已经看到，作为价值而独立化的价值——或者说财富的一般形式——除了量上的变动，除了自身的增大外，不可能有其他的运动。这种价值按其概念来说，是全部使用价值的总汇；但由于它始终只是一定量的货币（在这里是资本），所以它在量上的界限是与它的质相矛盾的。因此，它的本性是要经常地越出自己的界限……所以，对于自己坚持为价值的那个价值来说，增大和保存自己已经合而为一，它能保存自己，只是由于经常地越出自己在量上的界限，而这种界限是同它的形式规定，同它的内在的一般性相矛盾的……一定的货币额……对于使货币恰恰不再成为货币的一定消费来说，可能完全够用。但是货币作为一般财富的代表，就不会是这样了。作为一定量的数额，作为有限的数额，货币只是一般财富的有限的代表……因此，货币根本不具有按照它的一般概念所应当具有的那种能力……因此，作为财富，作为财富的一般形式，作为起价值作用的价值而被固定下来的货币，是一种不断要超出自己的量的界限的驱动力。” (Marx 1973, 270/MEW, Vol. 42, 195-6.)(21)
已经阅读过前文我们对“辩证法”的讨论的读者，应该会立即意识到这段论证是黑格尔主义式的。实际上，马克思在这里所做的就是，从作为价值的一般等价形式的货币“概念”与任何特定数量的货币都必须受到的经验限制之间的所谓矛盾中，推导出作为自我扩张的价值的资本“概念”。正是由于任何特定数量的货币都不是依据其概念而“应当”是的那个东西（尽管我们【297】之前没有机会对这一公式进行讨论，但它同样也是黑格尔主义公式中的一种[11]），它才被赋予了不断超越这一界限并扩张的驱动力。这一点被错误地当成对资本流通中存在的“剩余价值”或利润的解释。
与黑格尔主义一样，这一论证实际上完全只是看起来正确。首先，正如马克思在前一章《货币章》中令人信服地证明的那样，货币代表着“全部使用价值的总汇”，并不意味着它应该在数量上是无限的，而只是意味着它应该在质量上是一般的(general)：正如我们所看到的，它是商品的现存的一般性(existing generality)，所有特殊种类的商品都可以立即转换为货币，并因此所有特殊种类商品的相对交换价值都可以用货币的单位来衡量。货币的质的同质性使得其他商品的交换价值都能够通过其得到统一的量的表达。但无论是这种尺度职能的实现，还是货币实在的流通职能的实现，都不要求货币本身的数量是无限的。只有在有无限价值的商品流通时，货币的基本职能才会要求货币的数量也是无限的！
其次，即使我们承认这种从任何特定数量的限制中抽象出来的东西在某种程度上属于货币“概念”的一般性(generality)（正如刚才所指出的那样，这一点肯定是错的），任何特定数量的货币的量的界限与这一一般(general)“概念”之间的所谓的矛盾，只有在假设任何种(sort)中的任何特殊——或实际上是任何类(genus)中的特殊种(sort)（回想一下黑格尔话语中"Besonderheit"的歧义）——仅仅凭借其作为特殊而与其所属的种(sort)或类(genus) “相矛盾”(22)这一黑格尔主义理论的有效性之后才能得到。但这完全是一派胡言。特殊只有凭借其“概念”——或者更准确地说，可以合理地包含它的任何概念——所规定的特征与其特有的特征的结合才实际上是个特殊。同样地，某个类的特殊种(species)只有凭借【298】定义该类(genus)本身的特征与这一特殊种或属于这一特殊种的亚种(sub-species)所共有的且与同一类的其他种特有的额外特征不同的特征的结合才实际上是个特殊，如果不是这样的话，如果一个类的所有特殊种都仅仅表现出定义该类本身的特征且没有其他不同之处，那么(a)它们全都是完全相同的，因此这一类不会有实际上的一系列种，(b)这一完全相同的种(species)实际上就是类(genus)。同样的，如果一个种(sort)的所有特殊样本都仅仅表现出定义该种本身的特征，那么(a)它们全都是相同的，且这一种不会有实际上的一系列特殊样本，(b)这一完全相同的客体实际上就是一个“抽象”客体。[12]但是，某些类(genus)的特殊种(species)或某些种(sort)的特殊样本并没有凭借额外特征与定义其类(genera)或种(sorts)本身的特征的结合，从而与后者“相矛盾”。如果“相矛盾”的话，我们就不得不得出这样的结论，例如，锌不是金属——因为，它是金属的一个特殊种！只有在不惜一切代价坚持黑格尔的唯心主义原则时，才可能倾向于支持这种逻辑谬误。
应该指出的是，马克思对资本流通的“推导”相对于其黑格尔主义原型有一个特点：正如已经说过的那样，货币按照其定义在质上是同质的，这与商品在质上的多样性恰好相反。因此，货币唯一能够发生的变化就是数量上的变化。[13]因此，正如我们看到的，马克思的论证中所指出的货币的“特殊性”就是特定数额的特殊性。现在，正如克服每一质的限制的“驱动力”就是朝着普遍性或黑格尔所说的“真正的无限者”，即它的总体性的驱动力，【299】克服每一量的限制的驱动力也是朝着数量上的无限大的驱动力。但正如已经指出的，特殊的特殊性，无论是质上的还是量上的，在任何情况下都不会包含着这样的一个“驱动力”。即使假设包含了这样的一个“驱动力”，任何确定数量的界限，也就是使其恰好成为这一数量的界限，也既是“向上的”又是“向下的”，那么为什么这一数额的货币不应该通过尽可能减少而非增加来突破其界限呢？[14]
然而，马克思的论证不仅是似是而非的；它也同样与黑格尔主义相一致，使人感到困惑：它掩盖了而非阐明了它所宣称的内容。通过从货币概念中“推导”出资本概念，马克思指出作为货币资本的货币的流通是货币本身流通的必要条件：货币本身“本质上”是货币资本。但如果还能从马克思对资本叙述的失败中学习到什么的话，那就是“剩余价值”，以及构成后者的作为资本的货币的流通，实际上只有在社会生产关系比单纯的货币本身的流通所需的社会生产关系更具体的条件下，才是可能的。对于后者，只需要生产由私人承担，且至少部分产品通过交换机制再分配——至于这些私人是自己控制生产资料的小商品生产者、“自我管理”的工人合作社还是资本主义企业则完全无关紧要。为交换而生产，就是作为货币的货币存在的唯一条件。当然，这也是作为资本的货币存在的必要条件：也就是说，货币本身的流通是作为资本的货币的流通的必要条件，这不足为奇。但为交换而生产并不是作为资本的货币存在的充分条件（也就是说，【300】与马克思的“推导”相对的，事实并非如此，而是相反的，作为资本的货币的流通并不是作为货币本身流通的必要条件）。为了使货币行使作为货币资本的职能，除了上述的必要条件之外，还必须形成一类“自由的”雇佣劳动者，这些人由于缺乏生产资料而被迫周期性的出卖他们的劳动力（参见Rosenthal, 1998, ch. 6, sec. 6.3）。并非商品交换本身，而是在交换的背景下，劳动力的买卖才如马克思所说，是资本存在的“必要条件”。[15]
注释：
[10] 见MEW, Vol. 29, 260.（《马克思恩格斯全集》第一版第29卷第250页；《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第50卷未知页码；《马克思恩格斯文集》第10卷第143页）正如马克思在插入句中说的那样，偶然的机会是指他的朋友弗莱里格拉特将一本二手《逻辑学》作为礼物送给了他（不过我们现在并不清楚这是哪一版的《逻辑学》）。具有讽刺意味的是，这本弗莱里格拉特所“发现”的书，其原本的主人正是巴枯宁！在其他的信件中，我们可以了解到，马克思自己的初版《逻辑学》在早些时候留在了他在科隆的藏书中（同样的，马克思也没有指明这本书是“大”《逻辑》还是“小”《逻辑》）——自此再也拿不回来了。[见Marx's letter to Engels of February 27, 1861 [in MEW, Vol. 30, 160]中提及的藏书的最终命运：“Die Kölner haben schön mit meiner Bibliothek gewirlschaftet，”他抱怨道——“科隆人把我的藏书处理得很妙。”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第一版第30卷A第159页）(23)]根据当前学术界对“马克思与黑格尔关系”的主流看法，偶然获得的前一本书更重要一些，但根据本文的观点，后一本书（但在时间上更靠前）或许对马克思的经济学发展更为关键。
[11] 见Hegel, 1969, 131-6中“限制与应当”一节以及接下来的说明“应当”。（可见《黑格尔全集》第五卷逻辑学I，先刚译，人民出版社，第112-6页）
[12] 实际上，与可经验对象相对，存在着一些这种“抽象”的例子：特别是几何图形，其存在完全由它们的“概念”决定——例如椭圆由特定的代数公式决定——且没有任何特殊特征的残余。
[13] 主权货币的多样性显然与这一说法相矛盾。因为这些货币之间的本质区别并不是它们表现出的任何实在的质，而仅仅是发行当局的经验多样性。从这个角度上说，货币之间的差异仅仅只是名义上的——即使这种名称上的多样性在国际贸易和金融领域中具有显而易见的关键意义。
[14] 在《资本论》第一卷中，马克思简要地重述了他在《政治经济学批判大纲》中的论证，期间出现了一些暂时性的黑格尔主义“闪回”。(1976, 252/MEW, Vol. 23, 166)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第177页）但在《资本论》中，这种“闪回”中所实际讨论的主题并不是货币“概念”，就像他暂时回归黑格尔所暗示的那样，而是社会行动的合理性——实际上，商品交换本身（或“为买而卖”）和投资（或“为卖而买”）——分别与作为货币的货币和作为资本的货币的流通相关。马克思的观点是，相比于前者此刻的消费需求所提供的限度，后者并没有给定的额外经济限度，因此原则上是“无尽的”(endlos)和“无限的”(maßlos) (252-3/166-7)（《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第177-8页）。就这一方面，见马克思在脚注6中对亚里士多德对“货殖”（或“赚钱术”）和经济的区分的认可。
[15] 在历史上更早出现的所谓“让渡利润”或商业利润与这一说法并不矛盾。在前资本主义社会形态中，商业企业的所谓“利润”实际上只是一种净收入，与小商品生产者通常以总收入超过总成本的形式获得的“利润”在实质上并没有什么区别。实际上，这一事实指出了马克思分析中的一个更加严重的困难：即马克思认为资本主义生产的典型特征是G—W—G’的流通，但它实际上是所有商品生产形式的特征，因为生产性支出与个人消费支出被分别列在不同项目下。相反，由于马克思将这两种支出在同一项目下列出，那么在“简单再生产”的假设下，资本家的支出与收入甚至也可以简单地用G—W—G来描述。收入实际上并没有超过支出。商品所有者从商品的销售中定期取得的总收入稳定地覆盖了为满足其个人消费需求而产生的定期的支出。当然，这并不是说，资本主义意义上的“利润”术语，即资本利润也与净收入没有区别，只是为了充分把握这一区别，即资本利润实际上是净收入在历史上的一种特定种类，我们需要修改马克思的表述。
译者注：
(18) 这里以讽刺新黑格尔马克思主义者的语气引用列宁的话，见注释[3]。
(19) 圣安东尼是一位苦行僧，他独居在沙漠中，并保持着严格的饮食与禁欲以与上帝沟通。据说恶魔在此期间试图用无聊、懒惰和色欲等方式引诱其堕落，但圣安东尼通过祈祷的力量击退了恶魔。罗森塔尔认为，马克思面对黑格尔恶魔的吸引，也采取了圣安东尼的姿态，最终击退了黑格尔主义的诱惑。
(20) 《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第30卷第220-1页、第233-4页。
(21) 《马克思恩格斯全集》第二版第30卷第227-8页，译文有改动。
(22) 这一从句的翻译参考了《黑格尔全集》第六卷逻辑学II，先刚译，人民出版社，第228-9页。
(23) 马克思在讽刺科隆人将他的藏书库偷了个一干二净。结合前后文马克思写其他事情时的语气，他显然对藏书库被偷一事愤怒至极。
Marx's Hegelian Temptation
Now, if "Hegel's dialectic" is not much to be found in Hegel, is it reasonable to expect that it plays a more prominent role in Marx? Of course, it is well known that in his later years Marx frequently commented upon his alleged debt to Hegel and even, in what Althusser baptized the "famous quotations" from the Afterword to the 2nd (1873) German edition of Capital, suggested that his own "method" was indeed a "dialectical" one in some (albeit rather tortuous) manner deriving from the Hegelian original. But such professions of faith do not prove much. As I remarked upon above, Marx's schooling in Hegelian philosophy did make a real, if paradoxical, contribution to the development of his economic theory. It provided him, namely, with a set of linguistic formulae perfectly suited to grasping the nature of money as the "general equivalent form" of value. It did not provide him with any "method" of analysis or protocols of argumentation. That Marx himself did not exhibit a very exact understanding of the character of this contribution should not be considered anything other than an entirely normal state of affairs as far as the history of science is concerned.
I do not want, however, simply to insist on the fact that in his mature economic analyses - in Capital, most notably, and "especially in its first chapter" - Marx did not employ any special "dialectical" mode of argumentation. I want to suggest that in order to realize those analyses, in order to make his most important economic discoveries, Marx had indeed to free himself from the temptation to employ such a mode of argumentation: that is to say, to contrive just the sort of Hegelian "derivation" of economic categories which others have of late been tempted to contrive in his name or on his behalf. For in fact, given the ontological peculiarity of his object, Marx was tempted to do so and even on occasion succumbed to this temptation. The seductive appeal that Hegelian patterns of argumentation had for Marx is especially conspicuous in the Grundrisse manuscripts, which, contrary to the tradition of interpretation initiated by Roman Rosdolsky's monumental The Making of Marx's Capital , I would propose should be read in the manner of a St. Anthony-like struggle by Marx to beat back his Hegelian demons.
In an oft-cited letter to Engels, dated January 14, 1858 and written by Marx in the midst of his composition of the Grundrisse, Marx alludes to some recent "nice developments" in his economic investigations and remarks that "in the method of treatment it was of great service to me that I by mere accident . . . again had leafed through Hegel's Logic" [10] Now, it is of some interest to note that the particular example which Marx gives of such "nice developments" concerns not the theory of value per se, but rather the analysis of profit. Since we know this and since, in any case (as Arthur, 1991, has pointed out in connection with this letter in a review of recent literature on the "Marx-Hegel relation") , the Grundrisseis divided into a series of dated notebooks, it is a simple enough matter to confer the relevant sections in order to check whether Marx's re-reading of Hegel was in fact of as great a service to him as his spontaneous judgment at the time would suggest. Doing so reveals indeed a concerted effort on Marx's part to employ Hegelian schemata and patterns of argumentation, but one that only serves in fact to lead him repeatedly into theoretical cuh-de-sac.
In two quite blatant instances not far from the outset of the so-called "Chapter on Capital," Marx attempts to arrange the contents of his investigations in conformity with the "moments" of the Hegelian "syllogism" (Marx, 1973, 264, 275-6/MEW, Vol. 42, 188, 201). More significant for our purposes, however, is a passage that occurs in between these two classificatory experiments and that represents, I would suggest, Marx's only notable attempt to provide a properly Hegelian "transition" from money to capital This passage is especially significant, since the "new" Hegelian Marxists have almost univocally insisted upon the existence or at least feasibility of just such a "transition" as proof for the correctness of the "method" which they defend. What Marx writes, in part, is this:
We have already seen, in the case of money, how value, having become independent as such - or the general form of wealth - is capable of no other motion than a quantitative one; to increase itself. It is according to its concept the quintessence of all use-values; but, since it is always only a definite amount of money (here, capital), its quantitative limit is in contradiction with its quality. It is therefore inherent in its nature constantly to drive beyond its own barrier. . . . Already for that reason, for value which adheres to itself as value, preservation and increase go together; and it preserves itself precisely only by constantly driving beyond its quantitative barrier, which contradicts its formal determination, its inner generality. ... A determinate sum of money . . . can entirely suffice for a determinate consumption, wherein it ceases to be money. But as a representative of general wealth it cannot do so. As a quantitatively determinate sum, a limited sum, it is only a limited representative of general wealth. ... It thus does not by any means have the capacity which according to its general concept it ought to have. . . . Adhered to as wealth, as the general form of wealth, as value which counts as value, it is thus the constant drive to go beyond its quantitive limit. (Marx 1973, 270/MEW, Vol. 42, 195-6.)
Readers who have followed our earlier discussion of "dialectics" will recognize the Hegelian cast of this argument straightaway. What Marx does here, in effect, is to derive the "concept" of capital as self-expanding value from an alleged contradiction between the "concept" of money as the general equivalent form of value and the empirical limitation to which any particular sum of money must be subject. It is because any particular sum of money is not what according to its concept it "ought" to be (and this formulation, though we have not had occasion to discuss it previously here, is also distinctively Hegelian [11]) that it is endowed with the continual impulse to transcend this limitation and hence to expand. And this is supposed to explain the existence of the "surplus value" or profit which the capital circuit comprises.
As befitting its Hegelian inspiration, such an argument is indeed wildly specious. In the first place, from the fact that money represents, as Marx has convincingly demonstrated in the previous "Chapter on Money," the "quintessence of all use-values," it does not follow that it ought to be quantitatively unlimited, but only qualitatively general: it is, namely, as we have seen, the existing generality of commodities, into which all particular sorts of commodities are immediately convertible and in units of which the relative exchange-values of the latter are hence made commensurable. The qualitative homogeneity of money is what enables the uniform quantitative expression of the exchange-values of other commodities in it. But neither the fulfillment of this measurement function, nor that of money's real circulatory function, requires the quantity of money itself to be unlimited. The essential functions of money would only entail such a consequence on the assumption that there were commodities in circulation of unlimited value!
In the second place, even if we granted that it somehow belongs to the generality of the "concept" of money that abstraction be made from every particular quantitative limit upon it (which, as just noted, is surely not so), still the alleged contradiction between the limited amount of any particular sum of money and this general "concept" would only obtain on the assumption of the validity of the Hegelian doctrine that any particular of whatever sort - or indeed (recalling the ambiguity of "Besonderheit' in Hegelian discourse) any particular sort of whatever genus - "contradicts" the sort or genus to which it belongs: namely, just by virtue of being particular. But this is utter nonsense. A particular is only in fact particular by virtue of combining with the features specified in its "concept" - or, more precisely, any concept under which it can be legitimately subsumed - features that are idiosyncratic to it. Similarly, a particular species of some genus is only in fact particular by virtue of combining with the features that define the genus as such, other features that are common to the particulars or sub-species belonging to it, but different - viz., specifically different - from the additional features proper to the other species of the same genus. If this were not the case, if all the particular species of a given genus exhibited just those features that define the genus as such without variation, then (a) they would all be identical and hence there would not in fact be a range of species of the genus in question, and (b) this one identical species would, in effect, be the genus. Similarly, if all the particular specimens of a given sort exhibited just those features that define the sort as such, then (a) they would all be identical and there would not in fact be a range of particular specimens of the sort in question and (b) this one identical object would have, in effect, to be an "abstract" object. [12] But the particular species of some genus or the particular specimens of some sort do not by virtue of combining additional features with the features defining their respective genera or sorts as such, thereby "contradict" the latter. Were this so, then we would have to conclude, for example, that zinc is not a metal - because, namely, it is a. particular sort of metal! One would only be inclined to endorse such logical abominations if already committed to upholding the principle of Hegel's idealism at all costs.
There is, it should be noted, one peculiarity of Marx's "derivation" of the capital circuit vis-à-vis its Hegelian archetype: this lies in the fact, already remarked upon, that money is by definition, and precisely in contrast to the qualitative diversity of commodities, qualitatively homogeneous. Hence, the only sort of variation of which money allows is a quantitative one. [13] The "particularity" of money to which Marx's argument alludes is thus, as we have seen, the particularity of a particular sum. Now, just as the "drive" to overcome every qualitative limitation is the drive toward universality or what Hegel calls the "true infinite," viz., the totality of that which is, so the drive to overcome every quantitative limitation is the drive toward numerical infinity. But, as noted, the particularity of the particular, whether qualitative or quantitative, does not, in any case, imply such a "drive." Even supposing it did, since the limits of any determinate quantity, which make it precisely the quantity that it is, are, so to speak, both "downward" and "upward," why should not the given sum of money strive to shed its limitations as much by diminishing as increasing? [14]
Marx's argument is not only specious, however; it is also, as again befits its Hegelian inspiration, mystifying, it obscures its ostensible subject-matter, rather than elucidating it. By "deriving" the concept of capital from the concept of money, Marx implies that the circulation of money as money-capital is a necessary condition for the circulation of money as such: that money as such is "in essence" money-capital. But surely if anything is to be learned from Marx's finished account of capital, it is that "surplus-value," and hence the circuit of money as capital which comprises the latter, is only in fact possible on the condition of the coalescence of social relations of production more specific than those which are requisite simply for the circulation of money as such. For the latter, it is only necessary that production be undertaken by private units, at least some part of whose goods are redistributed through the exchange-mechanism - whether these units be petty-commodity producers in control of their own means of production or "self-managed" workers' cooperatives or capitalist enterprises is entirely immaterial. Production for exchange, namely, is the only condition for the existence of money as money. Now, the same is, of course, a necessary condition for the existence of money as capital too: which is to say that the circulation of money as such is, hardly surprisingly, a necessary condition for its circulation as capital. But production for exchange is not a sufficient condition for the existence of money as capital (which is to say, contrary to the implications of Marx's "derivation," that it is not the case, conversely, that the circulation of money as capital is also a necessary condition for the circulation of money as such). For money to function as money-capital, it is necessary in addition that there be formed a class of "free" wage-laborers whose members, compelled by their lack of property in means of production, periodically alienate their very capacity to labor (cf. Rosenthal, 1998, eh. 6, sec. 6.3). Not commodity exchange as such, but rather, within the context of exchange, the sale and purchase of labor-power is, as Marx puts it, the "sine qua non" for the existence of capital. [15]
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